The Sonoran Desert is considered by ethnobotanists to contain one of the highest if not the highest number of edible native species of any region in the world. Some, like nopales, take a little getting used to, or like palo verde beans, involve some extra preparatory steps for the cook. Others, like saguaro, prickly pear, and barrel cactus fruit, are delicious even when unfamiliar and involve no challenge for the cook. My favorite among native foods is mesquite, which can be ground into a carob-like bean flour.
Velvet mesquite (Prosopis velutina) puts forth two crops of beans per year, one in the late spring and the second following the summer monsoon. Some of the second-crop pods are beginning to snap when bent, a sign that they're ready for picking. I just gave away the last of my mesquite flour--a friend is baking and selling vegan cookies to help bring a fellow judoka's children over from Cameroon--so I'm looking forward to picking a few gallons of pods and getting them milled by Desert Harvesters. I hardly picked any at all from the first crop as I didn't expect to use up last year's flour.
It would be generous to call locavory oversold. It may be advantageous to produce staple foods in Iowa, vegetables in Sinaloa, and physicists and 'bloggers in Tucson even if the environmental externalities are taken into account. We don't have much water and our diet is water-intensive. Nevertheless there's quite a bit to eat from around here and a certain romance to knowing where one's food came from. (This itself can be taken to an odd extreme--think of the menus at Chez Panisse.) This also can serve along with tradition as a symmetry-breaker. We only eat three meals per day and can think of dozens if not hundreds of equally good possibilities for each. "Go local" narrows the choices. Perhaps better still, in-season produce is still the best, as any tomato enthusiast can attest.
My reservations about locavory aside: Tucsonivores, among Arizona culinary 'blogs, is the most interesting I've found. I'd add it to the roll, the but the last post was made in late 2007. It's nevertheless worthy of a read.
(My recipe for mesquite brownies will be posted later in the fall.)
Monday, September 14, 2009
At least one homosexual couple got married in AZ.
I missed this story in the Arizona Daily Star when it was printed back in February, but the act of civil disobedience is too clever to ignore:
A lesbian couple obtained a marriage license in Pima County by filling out the form as-is--without crossing out "male"--and submitting it. The legal theory on which they base their actions is that they only affirm that the information they fill in is correct; any errors on the pre-printed County form are not the subject of their oath. They made this explicit to the clerk and were told that it is not a problem. The Pima County Clerk's office's policy is not to look up skirts, grab crotches, or even ask about the gender of applicants for a marriage license.
Looks like I also failed to report on the collapse of the institution of marriage in Pima County in the ensuing months, or the confusion that ensued as "valid concepts" were muddled for elderly randish Libertarians with lame excuses for not standing up for the rights of others. Oh wait, none of that happened.
A bit of Google searching couldn't turn up the final disposition of this matter. Anyone who can provide me with an update, please do!
HT: Audrey Stirnitzke
A lesbian couple obtained a marriage license in Pima County by filling out the form as-is--without crossing out "male"--and submitting it. The legal theory on which they base their actions is that they only affirm that the information they fill in is correct; any errors on the pre-printed County form are not the subject of their oath. They made this explicit to the clerk and were told that it is not a problem. The Pima County Clerk's office's policy is not to look up skirts, grab crotches, or even ask about the gender of applicants for a marriage license.
Looks like I also failed to report on the collapse of the institution of marriage in Pima County in the ensuing months, or the confusion that ensued as "valid concepts" were muddled for elderly randish Libertarians with lame excuses for not standing up for the rights of others. Oh wait, none of that happened.
A bit of Google searching couldn't turn up the final disposition of this matter. Anyone who can provide me with an update, please do!
HT: Audrey Stirnitzke
Friday, September 11, 2009
Arizona steals a motorcycle...
Arizona virtually steals and destroys a motorcycle, and as 'blogger Adrian Little remarks, the implications are terrifying.
The "Church of Cognizance" case: Can compelling interest be circular?
The decision is no surprise: the Arizona Supreme Court ruled in State of Arizona vs Danny Ray Hardesty that Hardesty, despite being a member of the "Church of Cognizance", a cannabis-worshipping new-ageish sect, cannot eat or smoke cannabis wherever he likes and under whatever circumstances, and denied his A.R.S. § 41-1493.01-based appeal of a criminal sentence for possession with intent to distribute. (The COC self-represents as neo-Zoroastrian, but the connection to the Avesta or Mazdaism is limited to passages about Haoma.)
If nothing else, the case demonstrates why the task of expanding liberty, even very narrow religious liberty, and even narrower still, religious liberty of flakes, is best not left in the hands of flakes. The COC has been around since the early 1990s and had considerable time to file good, clean test cases establishing exemptions for religious use, first in private, then in public, then perhaps while operating a motor vehicle. Even if they waited for the burden-shifting statute's adoption as law, they had a full year to come up with a clean cases to start carving out exemptions. Better still, they could have joined with more established religious groups like the Hindus or even the Rastafarians to start pushing back against the prohibition of their sacrament. If anything demonstrates that there are less intrusive ways for government to pursue its compelling interest in limiting cannabis use per se--and that there is legitimately a compelling interest in protecting individual health is dubious--it is India's experience with legal bhang for both religious and recreational use; use by Rastas is largely illegal but their claims to both sincerity and harmlessness are much stronger thanks to history. (Which leads one to wonder: why hasn't either group raised a religious liberty challenge?)
A.R.S. § 41-1493.01 places the burden of proof on the State of Arizona to show that its policy is the least restrictive means to pursue a compelling interest. Hardesty's appeal by its nature forced the motor vehicle issue. If cannabis use leads necessarily to driver impairment (not clear) then a ban on use while driving is the least restrictive means for the state to pursue what would seem to be a legitimate compelling interest in keeping people from hitting other people with their cars. Think about it. If I claim that my (hypothetical) drunken driving is an expression of my sincere reverence for Bacchus (who's a bad motha-shut-yo'-mouth with whom you do not mess), Judge Pentheus should probably deny my appeal as my conduct infringes too much on the well-being of others.
The astute reader will note that the state prosecuted not for use but for possession. Fair enough. But the point stands: Justice Rebecca White Berch was able to avoid, in her opinion, and justices Ryan, Bales, and McGregor in their concurrence, questions of whether or not there was a less restrictive way for the government to pursue its interest when use in a private home or a religious ceremony are at issue.
That this was a poor choice of test case aside, the opinion itself contains a rather silly line of thought: that a ban could--and they do not take up the question of whether less intrusive policy is available--be justified in pursuit of the state's interest in halting criminal traffic in cannabis. Any criminal traffic is the result of the substance being contraband in the first place; Justice Berch is allowing for the possibility that the state could make something contraband because it is contraband, that the state has a circular, closed-loop compelling interest. There's no more charitable way to describe the argument, and I for one find it at least as dippy as the doctrines of the COC.
A final remark: Suppose that Hardesty were to have prevailed or that a similar but more limited appeal is successful in the future. We'd have a very strange situation on our hands, as faith would excuse one from marijuana prohibition, but reason would still be no defense. (Religious readers, especially Catholics, Buddhists, and Muslims, please note that I'm not making a general statement here about the connection between reason and faith.) If I light up, I couldn't claim as defense that I was doing it for enjoyment, that I'm aware of whatever health tradeoffs are involved, and that I endangered nobody. But I could get the law to leave me alone if I thought smoking a doob put me in better touch with Gitchee Manitou or like, spiritual consciousness, man. For reasons rooted in the U.S.'s early history, religious conduct is privileged in both popular belief and in the law. Yet it would seem--in light of consideration of compelling interest--to be sensible to adopt the following rule of thumb: Anything one is allowed to do in the name of faith, one should generally not be forbid to do. The irrational should not be privileged over the rational.
If nothing else, the case demonstrates why the task of expanding liberty, even very narrow religious liberty, and even narrower still, religious liberty of flakes, is best not left in the hands of flakes. The COC has been around since the early 1990s and had considerable time to file good, clean test cases establishing exemptions for religious use, first in private, then in public, then perhaps while operating a motor vehicle. Even if they waited for the burden-shifting statute's adoption as law, they had a full year to come up with a clean cases to start carving out exemptions. Better still, they could have joined with more established religious groups like the Hindus or even the Rastafarians to start pushing back against the prohibition of their sacrament. If anything demonstrates that there are less intrusive ways for government to pursue its compelling interest in limiting cannabis use per se--and that there is legitimately a compelling interest in protecting individual health is dubious--it is India's experience with legal bhang for both religious and recreational use; use by Rastas is largely illegal but their claims to both sincerity and harmlessness are much stronger thanks to history. (Which leads one to wonder: why hasn't either group raised a religious liberty challenge?)
A.R.S. § 41-1493.01 places the burden of proof on the State of Arizona to show that its policy is the least restrictive means to pursue a compelling interest. Hardesty's appeal by its nature forced the motor vehicle issue. If cannabis use leads necessarily to driver impairment (not clear) then a ban on use while driving is the least restrictive means for the state to pursue what would seem to be a legitimate compelling interest in keeping people from hitting other people with their cars. Think about it. If I claim that my (hypothetical) drunken driving is an expression of my sincere reverence for Bacchus (who's a bad motha-shut-yo'-mouth with whom you do not mess), Judge Pentheus should probably deny my appeal as my conduct infringes too much on the well-being of others.
The astute reader will note that the state prosecuted not for use but for possession. Fair enough. But the point stands: Justice Rebecca White Berch was able to avoid, in her opinion, and justices Ryan, Bales, and McGregor in their concurrence, questions of whether or not there was a less restrictive way for the government to pursue its interest when use in a private home or a religious ceremony are at issue.
That this was a poor choice of test case aside, the opinion itself contains a rather silly line of thought: that a ban could--and they do not take up the question of whether less intrusive policy is available--be justified in pursuit of the state's interest in halting criminal traffic in cannabis. Any criminal traffic is the result of the substance being contraband in the first place; Justice Berch is allowing for the possibility that the state could make something contraband because it is contraband, that the state has a circular, closed-loop compelling interest. There's no more charitable way to describe the argument, and I for one find it at least as dippy as the doctrines of the COC.
A final remark: Suppose that Hardesty were to have prevailed or that a similar but more limited appeal is successful in the future. We'd have a very strange situation on our hands, as faith would excuse one from marijuana prohibition, but reason would still be no defense. (Religious readers, especially Catholics, Buddhists, and Muslims, please note that I'm not making a general statement here about the connection between reason and faith.) If I light up, I couldn't claim as defense that I was doing it for enjoyment, that I'm aware of whatever health tradeoffs are involved, and that I endangered nobody. But I could get the law to leave me alone if I thought smoking a doob put me in better touch with Gitchee Manitou or like, spiritual consciousness, man. For reasons rooted in the U.S.'s early history, religious conduct is privileged in both popular belief and in the law. Yet it would seem--in light of consideration of compelling interest--to be sensible to adopt the following rule of thumb: Anything one is allowed to do in the name of faith, one should generally not be forbid to do. The irrational should not be privileged over the rational.
Richard Epstein: use Federal antidiscrimination laws to go after Sheriff Joe
My favorite contemporary political-philosophical thinker talks civil rights law in Forbes (HT: Reason Hit and Run), and recommends using it against one of my least favorite people:
Think this talk is bombast? Read up on the case of Julian and Julio Mora. Driving while appearing to be of Mexican descent appears now to constitute reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, for MCSO purposes.
So just what is left for the revitalized Civil Rights Division to do? The division should target state and local governments that, free of any competitive market pressures, pose genuine risks of unchecked discrimination. A quick read of William Finnegan's "Profile: Sheriff Joe [Arpaio]" in The New Yorker certainly counts in my book as probable cause for a DOJ investigation. Remember, on race relations the libertarian insight still holds true. Race discrimination does not survive in competitive markets. But it does flourish when public officials exercise monopoly power without external supervision.
Think this talk is bombast? Read up on the case of Julian and Julio Mora. Driving while appearing to be of Mexican descent appears now to constitute reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, for MCSO purposes.
Wednesday, September 09, 2009
From Grijalva's mouth, music to my ears?
"Maybe I was still in rapture, or maybe I was naïve, but I believed we were on the same page on what government’s role is in the delivery of health care and how to make the private insurances accounted."
From an interview on Politico.com.
From an interview on Politico.com.
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